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ROMAN SZUL : RÉGION, RÉGIONALISME ET UNION EUROPÉENNE. 
LA RÉGIONALISATION EN POLOGNE 
RÉSUMÉ 
L'adhésion á FUE a modifié la politique régionale et la régionalisation en Pologne. 
La relation entre le régionalisme national et l'Union européenne est en effet 
déterminée par quatre facteurs. Le premier est la réduction du rile traditionnel 
de 1'État nation aprés la Deuxiéme Guerre mondiale et la redéfinition des rela-
tions entre les États, avec priorité á 1'intégration européenne et au régionalisme. 
Le second est leffet des fonds de développement régional de 1'UE, encourageant 
la création de régions dans les nouveaux États membres de 1'Europe centrale et 
orientale. Le troisiéme est la politique de restrictions imposée récemment par 
1'UE á certains pays (et notamment aussi á 1'Espagne), suscitant une radicalisa-
tion des mouvements régionalistes (en Catalogne par exemple). Le quatriéme 
est Pexistence méme de WE et la nécessité des négociations européennes, ce qui 
inhibe les mouvements régionalistes et nationalistes souhaitant se séparer d'un 
État membre européen tout en restant membre de 1'UE. 
La relation entre régionalisme et Union européenne peut are qualifiée comme 
« modérément symbiotique ». Aprés la Deuxiéme Guerre mondiale, l'affaiblis- 
sement du nationalisme en Europe occidentale a stimulé Pintégration euro-
péenne et lessor du régionalisme. Comme la décentralisation a un effet positif 
sur le développement économique,l'UE a favorisé la décentralisation et la régio- 
nalisation dans les États membres. Les pays d'Europe centrale et orientale ayant 
adhérés á 1'UE en 2004, 2007 et 2013 devaient également suivre cette ligne. La 
Pologne a donc mis en place une grande réforrne territoriale. Néanmoins, les 
subventions aux régions sont limitées et les régions ne participent guére aux 
décisions européennes tandis que 1'Union européenne sbppose ciairement au 
régionalisme radical, conduisant au séparatisme. 
ILONA PÁL KOVÁCS 
THE RISE AND FALL OF REGIONALISM IN HUNGARY 
INTRODUCTION 
The Hungarian public governance has been a centralized one throughout the 
1000 years of its history. This fact appears especially in the role of the meso-
level governments. The change in the political system in 1990 maybe for the 
first time gave Hungary a chance to shape a decentralised governance system. 
However, the domestic set of conditions was not the only factor to determine 
the government model taking shape in the last decades at every level. Hungary 
had to make serious efforts to adjust its governance system to the standards 
formulated by the European Union. The almost permanent reforms of the re-
gional level were mainly justified by the adaptation to the EU cohesion policy. 
The last few years have brought completely new, centralizing ambitions which 
ended the former decentralisation period and had a crucial impact also on the 
fate of territorial governance. 
THE HISTORY OF MESO-LEVEL GOVERNANCE OF HUNGARY 
The foundations of the Hungarian state, as a guarantee to its belonging to Europe, 
were laid down by our first king, Stephen, who drew the whole of the country 
under his reign by expanding lands owned by the King and building out royal 
counties around the castles. We can thus say that the state power is just as old 
as the counties are. The head of the county was the governor of the castle or the 
governor of the county (called "comes"), who governed the domain and the 
people (Pálné, 2001). 
By the early 13th century, the disintegration of the system of royal counties 
started as a consequence of donating the royal domains to noblemen. The coun- 
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ties increasingly became the framework for the participation of the nobility in 
public life. A royal certificate from the year of 1232 gave self-government rights 
to the county noblemen, and by the end of the century the so-called noblemen's 
counties became the political self-governments, headed by the lord lieutenant 
appointed by the king. The organisation of counties gradually expanded in a 
so-called deconcentrated administrative system subordinated to the king and 
smaller administrative units, the districts gradually strengthened, too. 
Joseph II, the Habsburg king took overt measures against the Hungarian 
independence when he eliminated the autonomy of the noblemen's counties 
and also changed their borders in 1784. In the name of modernisation, Hun-
gary was divided into ten, Transylvania into three districts, with royal lord 
lieutenants with practically unlimited power. After the death of Joseph II, the 
system of the districts ceased to exist and the self-governments of the noblemen 
were restored as a symbol of Hungarian independence. 
In the so-called Reform Age before the revolution in 1848, the counties were 
subject to considerable debates. Many argued that the role of the counties was 
important as a guarantee of national independence and of the liberty of the 
settlements. Others considered the counties as the biggest obstacle in the way 
of a bourgeois transformation and a modern, centralised public administration. 
The revolutionary legislation in 1848 regarded the county organs as bastions 
of constitutionality, but they intended to democratise the feudal institution into 
a system based on the representation of the people. Finally there was no time 
to adopt the act because of the events of the war of independence. The arbitrary 
measures taken after the war of independence was pput down were much like 
the reform attempts by Joseph II. Hungary was divided into five districts, with 
complete eradication of the autonomy of the counties. The counties were led by 
lord lieutenants, and the districts by administrative chiefs. 
The Habsburg-Hungarian Compromise in 1867 opened the way for the 
consolidation of public administration. Acts on the counties and municipalities 
were created and regional administration was fitted into the integrity of state 
control. This was the period when the establishment of the so-called deconcen-
trated public administration took a strong impetus, subordinate to relevant 
certain ministries. In the Horthy era following the civil democratic revolution 
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of 1918 and the council republic of 1919, regional administration was built on 
two pillars: local governments and the special branches of state administration. 
In this period, centralising tendencies became more and more dominant. The 
territory and division of the counties were seriously affected by the Trianon 
Peace Treaty closing World War L Out of the 63 counties only 33 remained in 
Hungary, and among them only 10 untouched, in the original shape. In 1923 
the so-called `broken counties (some of which were now beyond the state bor-
ders after the peace treaty) were integrated, setting the number of the counties 
at 25 (Figures 1,2,3, Hajdú, 2005). County organs were partly elected and part-
ly delegated. The counties were led by lord lieutenants, appointed by the head 
of state, who were given a more and more significant political role. A strong 
hierarchy was formed between the various government actors and levels. The 
county self-governments were inspected by the lieutenant governors, the vil-
lages and towns by the district administrators. Between the two world wars 
territorial governance was taken over by the penetrating deconcentrated ad-
ministration directly subordinated to the central power. 
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On the whole, the self-government sector gradually weakened as opposed to 
the deconcentrated state administration. Another special feature of the his-
torical development of spatial administration in Hungary is that it existed under 
foreign oppression for centuries, it followed foreign patterns, and modernisation 
in the form of regionalisation was often blocked by the fact that a foreign ruler 
wanted to introduce it. Paradoxically, this feature of state organisation continued 
after World War II when the Soviet council model of regional administration 
was introduced. In 1950 the so-called Council Act practically eliminated the 
rights of the independent local governments in regional decision making and 
created a hierarchical territorial governance system. The power logic of the 
model is clearly reflected by the definition of the council system, claimed by the 
administrative ideologists of the communist party: "local councils are not the 
organs of local power but local organs of [state] power" (Beér, 1951). In this 
system, the key decision-makers were the county councils that had to assert 
central and local interests at the same time. The counties had direct personal 
influence on local policy and they were responsible for the allocaton of develop-
ment resources to municipalities according to their own priorities and likings. 
The borders of the counties changed in 1949 and their number has been 19 
without any change since then. 
It can be argued that the counties have remained dominant units of the 
Hungarian state for a thousand years, but their content, borders and numbers 
have continuously changed. In certain periods they were clearly the frameworks 
of decentralisation and the opposition to central, and sometimes foreign op-
pressive, power. At the same time, the counties were from the very beginning 
the targets and means of centralisation as well. This is the main explanation for 
the painful struggle about the decision about the meso level after the political 
changes. 
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THE POLITICAL CHANGEOVER AS A CHANCE FOR REGIONAL 
DECENTRALIZATION 
The political changeover led to a fundamental transformation not only in the 
model but also in the territorial structure. The Act on Local Governments, en-
acted in 1990, brought about a completely new situation in the spatial distribu-
tion of power. Instead of the former counties municipalities became the key 
elements of the local government system. Freedom and independence from 
central government were the focal point and value of the Hungarian model. The 
legislators of the Hungarian local government model made conscious efforts to 
eliminate all compulsory and hierarchic aspects. This ambition put an end to 
the centuries-long dominance of the counties. Referring to democracy and 
autonomy, the 1600-some former local councils were replaced by more than 
three thousand municipalities. Due to the fragmentation and the lack of willing-
ness to associate, the system became more expensive and in many cases operates 
with very low levels of efficiency and quality. The other structural change was 
the almost total elimination of the county's power. The lack of competencies 
and resources went together with the weak political legitimacy of county as-
semblies due to the indirect model of their election. Using this power vacuum 
the central government and the ministries in particular established their own 
"bridge-head" positions at meso-level. The increasing direct influence of the 
central government on the territorial level contradicted the original philosophy 
of letting local and regional issues be controlled by the elected self- governments. 
It can be stated that the Act on Local Governments has played an extremely 
important part in the construction of the Hungarian democratic state structure. 
Local communities were given a wide scope of competencies and autonomy 
and therefore they have become important schools of democratic political 
learning. However, the structure of the local government model has not proved 
to be suitable and sustainable for the consequent decentralization of governance 
system. Weakening of the elected county governments has led to a massive 
increase in the influence of the central government. Correction of the original 
model has proved to be difficult. 
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The Act was amended in 1994, but the reinforcement of the county govern-
ments did not take place, primarily because of the resistance of the munici-
palities, especially of cities of county rank and the lack of consensus among the 
political elite. The next decades were spent by repeated reform attempts to rescale 
the territorial administration motivated rather by external EU pressure than by 
internal recognition of the need for stronger meso-level government. Although 
the European Union in general considers public administration as a national 
affair, on the other side it has established a fairly influential regulation for using 
the Structural Funds. The principles of subsidiarity and partnership of EU cohe-
sion policy have contributed to the emerging or strengthening of the regions 
and made them vital factors in the multilevel governance, however not with the 
same consequences in Eastern Europe (Bache et al. 2011). Behind the slogan of 
regionalism, however, varied intentions, values and even concepts of geo-
graphical configurations are detected. 
The Act on Spatial Development in 1996 aimed to adapt to European region-
alism did not result in a positive turn concerning the positions of the counties. 
A great dilemma was whether the approximately 160 micro-regional units 
(NUTS4), the 19 counties (NUTS3) or the seven macro-regional units (NUTS2) 
should be the main action place of regional policy (Figure 4). The legislator 
decided to establish special institutions (so-called development councils) at all 
three territorial tiers. This conglomeration of development councils contrib-
uted to the fragmentation of development resources, the competition among 
the tiers, and conflicts evolving due to a lack of clear division of labour. What 
is most important, the real `European macro (NUTS2) regions could not become 
central actors in regional policy and also eroded the position of the 19 county 
self-governments. The parallel institutional structures and the jungle of compet-
ing geographical (regional, county and micro-regional) units did not result in 
strengthening the mese-level as a whole. 
2002 meant a new turn in the position of county governments, when the new 
government announced a radical programme of region alisation, that is, the 
election of regional governments from 2006. The ambitious government pro-
gramme was not realised, and although some drafts were developed, the process 
did not reach the political decision-making phase. The government re-elected 
in 2006 made attempts again at a comprehensive reform of the Constitution 
and the Local Government Act, but it failed to gain the requisite support by two 
thirds in parliament. After the unsuccessful reform package, a dominant trend 
of `regional centralisation' appeared. By the end of 2006, the government pre-
scribed regional reorganisation of the deconcentrated public administrative 
organs in the counties. The merger of county organisations on a regional scale 
meant only a change of name plates without a real change in functioning. 
A special charm of `regional integration' was the designation of the seats of 
regional public administrative organs. The cities (county seats) aspiring at hous-
ing the headquarters of regionalised deconcentrated organisations competed 
with each other and could achieve that the official seats of different types of 
r 
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organisations were spread in various towns of their regions. This phenomenon 
is just one of the evidences that regions were artificial units, so it was the new 
boundaries and seats that were in the focus of political debate rather than the 
power consequences. 
The regionalisation of regional policy was also laden with contradictions. 
Although the NUTS2 regions became the most influential units having profes-
sional development agencies with skilled staff and some experience in partner-
ship cooperation, with EU accession the entire institutional system of national 
development policy lost its positions, including the regional level. The Hungar-
ian management system of EU Structural Funds set up in 2004 became strong-
ly centralised. Each operational programme, even the so-called regional 
operational programme was managed by the National Development Agency. 
The regional development councils and agencies were not granted decision-
making positions and were only endowed with a certain intermediary and 
advisory role. Arguments in favour of centralised management have undoubt-
edly existed, the European Commission having no trust in regional institu-
tional capacities did not insist on regionalised management. It is still quite 
contradictory that the process of regionalisation, officially supported by both 
the EU and the national government, was halted after 2004. Strong centralisa-
tion and the marginalisation of regional stakeholders in decision-making hard-
ly augmented the number of advocates for regional reform. Even the second 
programming period starting in 2007 did not bring any changes and the regions 
remained very weak actors in the EU cohesion policy, and the strong power of 
the centre remained. The story leads us to the conclusion that the territorial 
reform cannot and should not be exclusively handled as a part of the European 
adaptation process and made subordinate to the needs of regional policy. 
RETURN TO THE LEGACY OF CENTRALISATION 
A new period began with the ambitions of the right-wing government gaining 
power in 2010 in overall terms and also in relation to territorial public admin-
istration. Overtly defying the previous neo-liberal civil philosophy, Hungary 
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can currently witness the centralising and nationalising efforts under the ban-
ner of the `good' (neo-Weberian) state. No doubt, the government had to do 
something with this geographically confused, financially and professionally 
weakening territorial governance in order to cope with the emerging eco-
nomic crisis. The new government passed a new Constitution, as a symbol of 
the beginning of a new political era, claiming that the original (neoliberal and 
decentralised) model created 20 years ago was only temporary and unsuccess-
ful in coping with the problems and providing long term vision for the country. 
The new Constitution drafted a picture of a much stronger, `illiberal' state. It is 
no miracle that the new law on local governments adopted in 2011 moved also 
towards weaker and centrally more controlled model of local government sys-
tem. The position and status of self-governments in a strong and centralised 
state underwent serious modification. In the meantime, the government re-
frained from regionalisation in structural aspects with the stabilisation of the 
old counties as the meso-level of governance. The NUTS2 regions remained 
only statistical units having no any institutions and tasks. It is important to 
emphasise that the county has survived only on a geographical scale and not as 
elected county self-government since it has lost almost all competences, assets 
and power. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This is the end of 20 years long history of decentralisation in Hungary, which 
was mostly identical with the failed experiment of making the meso level a 
strong self-government. Without a strong meso tier, the governance system 
tends to be centralized having no counterbalance against the ever centralizing 
efforts of the national governments. This story outlined above leads to the con-
clusion that the territorial reform cannot and should not be exclusively handled 
as a part of the European adaptation process and made subordinate to the needs 
of regional policy. Adaptation to the European Union is thus one, but not the 
only and not even the most stable basis for regionalization. The main problem 
is that in the spirit of regionalism Hungary was not able to decentralise its 
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public power system. The reason is that the driving forces of regionalisation 
were only external and the domestic political commitment to decentralize power 
is missing. 
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SUMMARY 
Hungary has been a centralized country throughout 1000 years of its history. 
1990 was the first time Hungary had a chance to shape a decentralised system 
while making serious efforts to adjust it to the standards of the European Union 
and its "cohesion policy': The parallel institutional structures and the jungle of 
competing geographical and administrative (regional, county and micro-re-
gional) units did not allow the strengthening of the meso-level as a whole. By 
the end of 2006, the government prescribed regional reorganisation of the 
deconcentrated public administration organs in the counties. The merger of 
county organisations on a regional scale did not mean a real change in the 
functioning. The regions were artificial units, so the new boundaries and seats 
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were rather in the focus of political debate. The regionalisation of regional 
policy was laden with contradictions. Although the NUTS2 regions became the 
most influential units having professional development agencies with skilled 
staff, the entire institutional system of national development policy lost its 
positions, including the regional level. The new government passed a new con-
stitution, as a symbol of the beginning of a new political era, claiming that the 
original (neoliberal and decentralised) model created 20 years ago was unsuc-
cessful in coping with the problems and in providing a long term vision for the 
country. The government refrained from regionalisation stabilizing the old 
counties as the meso-level of governance. The NUTS2 regions remained only 
statistical units without any tasks. Here ended 20 years of decentralisation. 
This shows that territorial reforms cannot and should not be exclusively 
handled as a part of the European adaptation process and made subordinate to 
the needs of regional policy. Adaptation to the European Union is not a stable 
basis for regionalization. The main problem is that Hungary was not able to 
decentralise its public power system because the driving forces of regionalisa-
tion were only external without domestic political commitment to decentralize 
power. 
PÁLNÉ KOVÁCS ILONA:A RÉGIÓKTÜNDÖKLÉSE ÉS BUKÁSA 
MAGYARORSZÁGON (UGYANAZOK A GYÖKEREK) 
ÖSSZEFOGLALÁS 
Magyarország ezer éves történelme során centralizált állam volt. A rendszer-
váltás után, 1990-ben nyílt először lehetőség arra, hogy az Európai Unió nor-
máihoz igazodás és a kohéziós politikának megfelelés jegyében decentralizált 
rendszer épüljön ki. A párhuzamos intézményi struktúrák és az egymással 
versengő földrajzi és közigazgatási egységek (régiók, megyék, kistérségek) va-
lóságos dzsungele alakult ki, ami nem engedett teret a középszint megerősíté-
séhez. 2006 végére a kormány a dekoncentrált megyei szintű közigazgatási 
szerveket regionális alapon szervezte át. A megyei szervek regionális fúziója 
azonban nem járt a működés átalakításával. A régiók mesterségesen létrehozott 
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egységek voltak; az új határok és székhelyek folyamatos politikai viták tárgyát 
képezték. A regionális politika regionalizációja ellentmondásokkal volt terhes. 
Bár a NUTS2 régiók — jól képzett személyzettel működő professzionális fejlesz-
tési ügynökségeik révén — a legbefolyásosabb egységekként emelkedtek ki, a 
nemzeti fejlesztési politika egész intézményrendszere pozíciót vesztett, többek 
között regionális szinten is. Az új kormány az új politikai korszak nyitányát is 
jelképező új alkotmányt fogadott el, és kijelentette, hogy a 20 évvel ezelőtt lét-
rehozott eredeti (neoliberális decentralizált) modell nem volt képes kezelni a 
problémákat és nem tudott hosszú távú jövőképet mutatni az országnak. A kor-
mány a regionalizáció helyett a régi megyéket stabilizálta a kormányzás közép-
szintjeként. A NUTS2 régiók csupán kiüresedett statisztikai egységekként létez-
nek feladatok nélkül. Véget ért a 20 éves decentralizáció. 
Mindez világosan jelzi, hogy a területi reformokat nem lehet és nem is szabad 
kizárólag az európai integrációs folyamat részeként, a regionális politikának 
alávetve kezelni. Az Európai Unióhoz való alkalmazkodás nem teremt szilárd 
alapot a regionális fejlődéshez. Magyarország fő problémája, hogy nem sikerült 
decentralizálnia az államhatalmi rendszert, mert a regionalizációt csupán kül-
ső hajtóerők mozgatták, a belpolitika nem köteleződött el a hatalom decentra-
lizácója mellett. 
ILONA PAL KOVÁCS: AUFSTIEG UND FALL DER REGIONEN UNGARNS - 
IDENTISCHE WURZELN 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Ungarn war wáhrend seiner tausendjáhrigen Geschichte ein zentralisierter 
Staat. Erst nach der Wende, im Jahre 1990 ergab sich die Möglichkeit, im 
Rahmen der Anpassung an die Normen der Europáischen Union and der 
Befolgung der Auflagen der Kohüsionspolitik ein dezentralisiertes System 
aufzubauen. Es entstand ein wahrer Dschungel aus institutionellen Parallel-
strukturen and miteinander konkurrierenden geografischen and Verwaltungs-
einheiten (Regionen, Landbezirke, Kleinregionen), der einer Stárkung der 
mittleren Ebene keinen Raum lief3. Bis Ende 2006 hat die Regierung die de- 
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zentralisierten Verwaltungsbehörden der Landbezirksebene auf regionaler 
Basis neu organisiert. Mit der regionalen Fusion der Landbezirksbehörden 
ging aber keine funktionelle Umstrukturierung einher. Die Regionen waren 
künstlich aufgestellte Einheiten; die neuen Grenzen and Verwaltungssitze 
führten zu stündigen politischen Diskussionen. Die Regionalisierung der 
Regionalpolitik war von Widersprüchen belastet. Obwohl sich die NUTS2-
Regionen — auf Grund ihrer mit gut ausgebildetem Personal arbeitenden 
professioneIlen Entwicklungsagenturen — als die einflussreichsten Einheiten 
hervortaten, wurde die Position des gesamten institutionellen Systems der 
nationalen Entwicklungspolitik unter anderem auch auf regionaler Ebene 
geschwácht. Die neue Regierung verabschiedete — auch als Symbol für den 
Auftakt in eine neue politische Ara — eine neue Verfassung and erklárte, dass 
das 20 Jahre zuvor eingeführte ursprüngliche (neoliberal and dezentralisiert 
ausgerichtete) Modell die Probleme nicht zu lösen vermochte and dem Land 
keine langfristige Zukunftsvision bieten konnte. An Stelle der Regionalisierung 
stabilisierte die Regierung die alten Landbezirke als die mittlere Ebene des 
Regierens. Die NUTS2-Regionen existieren lediglich als ausgehöhlte statistische 
Einheiten, ohne Aufgaben. Die 2ojáhrige Geschichte der Dezentralisierung 
ging zu Ende. 
All dies zeigt deutlich, dass territoriale Reformen nicht ausschlie1 lick als Teil 
des europáischen Integrationsprozesses, der regionalen Politik unterstellt be-
handelt werden können bzw. dürfen. Die Anpassung an die Europáische Union 
schafft keine stabile Grundlage für die regionale Entwicklung. Das Hauptpro-
blem Ungarns besteht darin, dass es nicht gelungen ist, das System der Organe 
der Staatsmacht zu dezentralisieren, da die Regionalisierung nur von áuleren 
Kráften vorangetrieben wurde, die Innenpolitik hat sich der Dezentralisierung 
der Macht nicht verschrieben. 
183 
PÉLDÁK A HATÁRON ÁTNYÚLÓ REGIONÁLIS 
EGYÜTTMŰKÖDÉSRE 
EXAMPLES OFTRANSBORDER REGIONAL 
COOPERATION 
EINIGE BEISPIELE VON GRENZÜBERGREIFENDER 
REGIONALER ZUSAMMENARBEIT 
QUELQUES EXEMPLES DE COOPERATION 
RÉGIONALE TRANSFRONTALIÉRE 
184 RÉGIÓK EURÓPABAN 
ILONA PÁL KOVÁCS : GRANDEUR ET DECADENCE DES REGIONS EN HONGRIE. 
RÉSUMÉ 
La Hongrie a pendant toute son histoire a été un État centralisé. Aprés le chan- 
gement de régime en 1990, elle a pu construire un systéme décentralisé conforme 
aux normes de l'Union européenne et á sa politique de cohésion. Un vrai laby- 
rinthe de structures institutionnelles a été mis en place avec des unités géogra- 
phiques et administratives concurrentes (régions, départements, micro-régions), 
ce qui a empéché le renforcement du niveau intermédiaire. Fin 2006, le gouver- 
nement a réorganisé les unités administratives déconcentrées du niveau dépar- 
temental sur une base régionale, mais ceci n'a pas modifié le fonctionnement 
les régions sont restées des unités artificielles. La régionalisation a été pleine de 
contradictions. Bien que les régions NUTS2 aient émergé — avec leurs agences 
de développement professionneIles et un personnel bien formé — comme les 
unités les plus importantes, lénsemble du systéme institutionnel de la politique 
de développement national a perdu son importance, au niveau régional égale- 
ment. Le nouveau gouvernement a adopté une nouvelle constitution symbolisant 
1'avénement d'une nouvelle ére politique, déclarant le modéle (néolibéral et 
décentralisé) créé il y a vingt ans incapable de gérer les problémes. Face á la 
régionalisation, Ie gouvernement a confirmé les anciens Comitats en tant que 
niveau intermédiaire de 1'administration. Les régions NUTS2 ne som plus que 
des unités statistiques sans contenu. Les vingt années de décentralisation sont 
terminées. Ceci montre bien que les réformes territoriales ne peuvent et ne 
doivent pas étre traitées uniquement comme partie du processus de 1'intégration 
européenne, soumises á la politique régionale. La conformité á l'Union euro-
péenne ne crée pas une base solide an développement régional. Le probléme de 
la Hongrie est que, sans motivation intérieure, elle n'a pas réussi á décentraliser 
le pouvoir de 1'État. 
